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Bonaparte, the liberator
Luciano canfora
In the beginning of 1792, when the most dramatic changes of the Revolution had not yet been produced, and, however, the european powers considered the hypothesis of performing a military intervention in France in 
order to grant again to Louis XvI (who had been discredited before his people 
due to the escape from varennes) his full power, in Paris the “party of the war” 
was represented by the Girondists, particularly by Brissot and dumouriez. In 
april 20, with the so-called “Girondist cabinet”, the declaration of war was 
issued. as the emperor of austria had not responded to the French ultimatum, 
Maximilien Robespierre lined up, as of the first moment, against the choice of 
war. He was not, then, a member of the new parliament, the legislative assembly, 
but performed his battle in the club of the Jacobins, an important “pressure” 
group, but which was not yet a force of government. as of January the 2nd, 
Robespierre vigorously declared himself against the war, that is, especially against 
the Girondist pretense, or illusion, that “liberty” could be “exported”. “the most 
extravagant idea” said Robespierre, 
that can be born in the mind of a political man is to believe that, for a people, 
it suffices to invade the territory of a foreign people at gunpoint to make them 
adopt their laws and their constitution. nobody loves the armed missionaries; the 
first advice that nature and prudence offer is to repel them as enemies.
and further: “Wanting to grant freedom to other nations before having 
achieved it ourselves means to ensure, at the same time, our servitude and the 
servitude of the whole world.”
His speech shines due to its historical and political solidity. Robespierre 
(2000, t.vIII, p.81-2) reminds the Jacobins that the Revolution had been 
launched by the upper classes:
the parliaments, the noblemen, the clergy, the wealthy people were the ones 
that drove the Revolution forward; the people appeared only afterwards. they 
changed their minds or wanted, at least, to stop the Revolution when they 
realized that the people could recover their sovereignty; but they were the ones 
that started it. Without their resistance and their mistaken calculations, the 
nation would still be under the domination of the despotism.
and he continues:
For that reason, in order to successfully ‘export’ liberty (that is, the Revolution) 
it would be required to count on the support from the upper classes in the 
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countries on which we intend to focus our action. But now those classes, well 
warned of how the situation in France evolved, will avoid repeating the ‘mistake’ 
performed in France by their homologues! even in Brabant” – he observes -, 
“where the Revolution had been initiated before starting in France, but had 
been stopped afterwards, we will not find, not even there, the success and the 
reception imagined by those that put pressure so that freedom is exported.
against the venom that is present in every war adventure, Robespierre 
had fought even before, in his speech of december 18, 1791, addressed, as a 
pamphlet, not to the club anymore, but directly to the legislative assembly:
the war is always the major desire of a powerful government, which wishes to 
become more powerful still. It goes without saying that it is during the war that 
[...] the government enshrouds, under an impenetrable veil, its robberies and 
its mistakes. on the contrary, I will talk to you about what is directly closer to 
our interests. It is precisely during the war that the executive power expands its 
terrible energy and exercises a kind of dictatorship, which buries freedom. It is 
during the war that the people forget about the deliberations concerning to their 
civil and political rights.
History proceeded in another direction. the Girondists led France towards 
the war. at the beginning, the war was marked by failures that determined 
the psychosis of treason and of the “inner enemy” (which effectively existed). 
the king responded to the emergency measures propounded by the Girondist 
ministers by banishing them from the government. the people’s rebellion against 
this irresponsible gesture led to the insurrection of august 10, 1792, to the 
imprisonment of the king, to the killings of september, to the unexpected victory 
of valmy, to the trial and death sentence of the former sovereign by the new 
assembly, the Convention. In face of such gesture of complete rupture with the 
past, the “first coalition” was born, and the responsibility of taking the war up 
to the end got to the hands of the new Jacobin government “of public rescue”. 
thus, those men were forced to engage into the politics of war and permanent 
emergency to which, led by Robespierre, they were opposed.
However, by becoming offensive, the war originated a double process: the 
claim, which was very strong in the Convention, of the “natural boundaries” of 
France (therefore, a potential politics of annexation), and the firm persuasion that 
the war expenses should be faced by extracting resources from the “liberated” 
countries.
the decree of december 15, 1792 was promulgated, eliminating any 
hope of “gradualism” supported by the european Jacobins, mainly Italians and 
Belgians. a single policy was applied for all “liberated” countries: the imposition 
of the assignat (the currency that was causing inflation in France, a situation 
which was worsened by the treacherous and systematic issue, into the market, of 
false assignats by the english); the confiscation of the properties of the clergy, 
of the overthrown government and its adherents; the implementation of the 
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democratic (elective) system, but excluding the political rights of all “suspects”. 
thus, a dictatorship of local Jacobin minorities, propped on the French forces, 
was created. nevertheless, the annexations caused those minorities’ reputation to 
become worse still: savoy, nice, oneglia, Belgium, Rhineland, Basel.
Concurrently to the internal evolution of France - from Robespierre’s 
fall, to the thermidor, the directory, the Consulate -, an evolution that had its 
summit in the personal power and the empire, the war that “brought freedom” 
and democracy to the remainder of europe became a war of conquest, concealed 
by an ideological screen that was always less reliable. Bonaparte’s role in this 
inversion is central. He tried, as much as possible, to profit from the prestige 
capital that the Revolution had acquired with the progressionist and revolutionary 
elites of the whole europe. as much as possible, he played the role of “sword 
of the Revolution”, a role in which he himself, cynically, did not believe, while 
pursuing a politics of power in the newborn “French empire”.
Hence, it is not a reason for awe that, to the alignment of the Jacobin 
and, anyway, pro-French elites in the “liberated” countries, more and more 
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subaltern and, therefore, destined to the political defeat, corresponded a public 
discontentment against the French, the empire and the Revolution that had been, 
even in an unpredictable fashion, its matrix. and it is equally easy to understand 
how this “people” has found in the traditional symbols of the ancient Regime its 
point of reference and its guide. From the naples of 1799 to the spain of 1807, to 
the Russia of 1812, to the Germany of 1813.
obviously, verifying this inversion and this failure of the “export of 
liberty” (lucidly intuited by Robespierre when the Revolution had not yet become 
the external war) does not mean to imply that that tormented period, of nearly 
fifteen years, has not produced anything new, or that it has not left deep traces 
in the end. In this contradiction, in this transformation of europe by means of a 
system of power that represents the complete reversal of the liberating revolution, 
the Jacobinism crisis was consumed, in primis european, almost never able to be 
at a distance from the French empire and its charismatic leader: a crisis that ran 
the risk, for a rather long period, of restituting the populations to the ancient 
Regime.
In order to overcome such a significant defeat, decades and several factors 
were required: radically new ideas, the new protagonism of social classes that 
napoleon Bonaparte 
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had just emerged, the crisis of the moderate liberal solution, pale and alternative, 
destined to defeat in face of the vigorous sternness, even if counterproductive, 
of the coryphaei of the “Holy alliance”. However, a thread subsists that links 
– in the individual biography of some and in the reconsideration of the starting 
points that the Bonapartist Caesarism had caused, little by little, to vanish – the 
“old” survivors to the “new” revolutionaries. those that study these events can 
usefully resort to the literature, in addition to the historic, legal and economic 
documentation.
the oration to Bonaparte for the congress of Lyon (1802), by ugo 
Foscolo, is a pathetic and sad testimony, emblematic of the forma mentis of a 
man that, in spite of the disappointments, remained as a Jacobin until the end. 
on the other hand, napoleon’s brutal Realpolitik choice of returning venice (a 
democratic republic by then!) to austria due to the Campoformio peace (april, 
1797) froze the young Foscolo, who had imprudently exalted Bonaparte the 
liberator in verse. But afterwards, as often occurred subsequently also with other 
“liberators”, the certainty that, “in spite of everything”, and even if restrained 
within the clamps of the required “realism”, Bonaparte remained a “liberator” 
prevailed in Foscolo like in so many other militants.1 (the fact should not be 
excluded that napoleon continued to regard himself as such. But when the 
selfishness of a great power is persuaded that its own interest is also the general 
interest, and does not realize that, in the meantime, it is irremediably losing bits, 
even from vital pieces, this means, as a matter of fact, that the game was lost; it 
does not matter for how long.)
the unfortunate Foscolo, in 1802, writes seriously: “I will name you, 
therefore, Bonaparte, with the unheard-of title of LIBeRatoR oF PeoPLes 
and FoundeR oF RePuBLICs. thus the tall, unique, immortal you will 
dominate eternity”. We could well say that, here, there is nothing missing of 
what, in another time and for another charismatic personality, was defined as 
“cult of the personality”. But Foscolo goes on: “redeemer of France, terror of the 
tyrants and demagogues, Mars of Marengo, lord of victory and fortune, friend 
of the sacred Muses, cultivator of sciences, extremely profound expert in human 
beings”, and, further on, “invincible captain, legislator, philosopher”.
only after a couple of years, the assumption to the imperial title by the 
one that was still perceived by his own as the first general of the Republic will lead 
Beethoven to call off the dedication of his eroica, initially offered to napoleon.
* * *
the first book of War and peace begins with a memorable scene. It is 
about a conversation between the noblemen in the inviting residence of the 
earls Rostov, the chaotic, nice and hospitable family that makes the center of 
the whole novel. there, tolstoy places on the stage the embarrassing apology of 
napoleon – we are at the eve of austerlitz -, pronounced by the real protagonist 
of the whole novel, Pierre Besuchoff, destined, afterwards, by the author’s will, 
to a very different ideal and religious evolution. the pretext for the vivacious 
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dialectic confrontation, rigorously in French, the second language of the Russian 
aristocracy back then, is always the execution by a fire-squad of the earl d’enghien 
(March 21, 1804): battle-horse of the anti-napoleonic propaganda. the shooting 
was desired by napoleon and decreed by an extraordinary court martial, for the 
reatus of conspiracy against the first consul.
tolstoy, who is identified at a great extent with his character along its 
whole evolution, offers, through Pierre, a whole anthology of pro-napoleonic 
argumentations, which represent very well the authentic feeling of the Russian 
Jacobins: ultra-minority in their country, but stubbornly dedicated to provide 
meaning and logic to the long and certainly non-linear event of the Revolution; 
and, moreover, decided to offer to themselves, above all others, a justification 
for their own choices. “napoleon is great” – Pierre says - “because he has placed 
himself above the Revolution, repressed its abuses, retaining what it possessed 
of good – the equality of the citizens, the freedom of speech and press – and 
for that reason he conquered power”. and he adds: “the execution of the earl 
d’enghien was a political necessity, and it is precisely in this that I see napoleon’s 
greatness of spirit: he did not fear to take on upon himself, and himself alone, 
the responsibility for that act!” “dieu, mon dieu! (Lord, o my Lord!) - anna 
Pavlovna whispered, terrified -; Comment, M. Pierre, vous trouvez que l’assassinat 
est grandeur d’âme?! (You mean, Mr. Pierre, that you regard murder as greatness 
of spirit?!) – said the little princess, smiling and resuming her needlework. several 
voices rose. Capital! - said, in english, the prince Hippolyte, and started to slap 
his own knees”.
I say so - proceeded Pierre passionately, looking over his spectacles – because 
the Bourbons fled in face of the Revolution, leaving the people in anarchy; only 
napoleon knew how to understand the Revolution, how to overmaster it; and, 
for this reason, he could not, for the general good, be detained in face of the life 
of one man.
“Wouldn’t you like to move to this other table?” said anna Pavlovna. 
“no”. and Pierre went on with his speech. next, it will be up to the prince 
andrei, the defeated protagonist of the great novel, to conclude, with aristocratic 
coldness. “In the actions of a man of state – he said – it is necessary to 
distinguish those of the private man from those of the leader or emperor. that 
is what it seems to me”. and also for him, who would shortly be in austerlitz, 
napoleon remains always, so far, as for his friend Pierre, “the one that understood 
the Revolution, the one that succeeded in overmastering it”.
* * *
those men had warned about the change that had been produced, and, 
yet, justified the historical and most immediately political reasons for such 
change: they sought to put especially themselves in order.
the mutation, however, had begun way before the meteoric ascension of 
the first consul. one document appears, on this regard, quite enlightening. It 
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was published for the first time in the Mémoires of Louis-Marie La Révellière-
Lépeaux (1743-1824), member of the pro-Girondist Convention, then member of 
the directory.2
In it we can read the guideline, at the same time political and military, 
promulgated by the directory and addressed to the command that was 
responsible for the operations in Italy. It concerns to how the allies should be 
treated. the date is important: the embryonic 18 of the year v – april 7, 1797, 
ten days previous to Campoformio.
a couple of passages follow:
the executive directory has considered the situation of Italy following your 
victories and your wise politics. this situation is such that leads us, reasonably, to 
conceive the hope of establishing a powerful barrier between the French Republic 
and the House of austria, and, at the same time, to be able to reap an equally 
rewarding and glorious fruit from your success, that is, the freedom of a great 
portion of Italy.
However, the directory felt that it should not cling to a party that was so 
immutable to the extent of making impossible, or, at least, distancing too much 
the salutary work of peace, unless the honor and salvation of the citizens of those 
places would not be endangered by a premature indulgence on what concerned to 
their repeated requests for independence or by letting them act in consequence.
two powerful reasons should then and should still cause us to constantly resist to 
the granting of those wishes. the first one is the great inconvenience of exposing 
them to the cruelest revenges, as we have already said; and the other is the huge 
risk of driving to the revolution a people whose territory we militarily occupy, 
which could disorganize the army and exhaust the resources that we should 
exploit in order to support it and ensure its subsistence.
on the other hand, it would be extremely important not leaving Lombardy in 
the turmoil it is in. It is indispensable to do something to appease the restlessness 
that the uncertain conditions of the country cause to its own inhabitants, and 
it is also mandatory that you withdraw from the uncomfortable position in 
which you are in its confrontations. such position could, sooner or later, cause 
you great embarrassments [...] If they do not possess a stable and solid form of 
government already, they will devour each other by themselves without affirming 
their freedom, while the neighboring kings and the neighboring oligarchies will 
certainly keep them in an anarchic chaos that is so particularly unfortunate for 
the interests of the French Republic as for those of the representative system in 
general.
the conclusion is lapidary: “the Government should be in action 
everywhere, but the legislative will, while we remain here, should be manifested 
only by you”.
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a relevant text, since it places under our eyes the issue that occupies the 
center of the whole drama, destined to be replicated in history. that is, that 
already in the mind of your leaders, the guardianship of the selfish interest of 
the country that launched, with immense sacrifices, an epochal mutation, is 
inextricable from the certainty that it coincides with everybody’s interest: also 
of those that, for using the language of the time, did not wish to “be liberated”. 
a diagnosis that becomes, with time, more and more indigestible. among the 
neapolitan Jacobin deportees in France, for instance, it will not be difficult 
to find those that will consider physically eliminating the main responsible (in 
their opinion) for the degeneration of the French foreign policy into a power 
politics: that is, the first consul. In this picture the conspiracy associated to the 
so-called “attempt Ceracchi” (october 1800) ripens, sternly repressed by the 
first consul with proscriptions and capital punishments. the sternness and even 
the spirit of conquest belong to human “nature”. and certainly we, protected by 
the wisdom of the coming generations, will not be the ones to marvel at it. the 
revolutions will still be the “locomotives of history”; but, unavoidably, and maybe 
imperceptibly, the time comes in which those “locomotives” find themselves 
terribly belated on what concerns to a history that continues to proceed, and 
which, within this period, crushed men, lives, ideas, under its weight.
* * *
In face of the concrete execution of the conquest politics of the 
“liberators”, the european Jacobinism was put to a test from which it came out 
irrevocably marked. nevertheless, it has set apart for us a heritage of ideas and of 
criticism, at the very moment in which it was forced, by the sternness of history, 
to overcome itself, to transcend its own originary dimension and its own starting 
horizon.
such overcoming happened in the cross fire of both experiences that 
occurred within this period of years. on one hand, those are the deterioration 
of the relationship with the “liberators”; on the other hand, the terrible (and, for 
the neapolitan Republic, lethal) welding between “public” response and ancien 
Régime. a welding that imposes on every Jacobin (and, it could be said, on the 
Jacobins of all times) the question that is self-critical par excellence, and remains 
always open: Where have we been mistaken?
Notes
1  Moreover, Gramsci will not talk in the Quaderni, about the first Bonaparte, of “positive 
Caesarism”?
2  the Mémoires were published fifty years after his death. this document is kept in the 
national archives of Paris, under the indication a.F., III, 442, n.2. Its transcription can 
be found in the “Private record of the secret decrees and deliberations”, no. 306.
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